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Abstract
Duty of care is a critical component of any negligence claim
necessary to establish liability. It is well recognized at common
law that a physician owes a duty to advise a patient but is not
mandated to take affirmative measures outside the physicianpatient relationship to protect a third-party. Health care
providers may also be responsible for oversight, or the failure to
safeguard a patient, due to a special relationship they undertake,
such as failing to properly diagnose or recommend an
appropriate treatment plan. Recently, the courts have struggled
over whether public policy and fairness require the expansion of
the law to impose liability upon health care providers for injuries
sustained by third parties caused by patients in motor vehicle
accidents.
Various theories are advanced to establish liability, such as
the physician being negligent by violating a statute created to
protect the public through negligence per se, establishing prima
facie negligence, or offering evidence of carelessness. A clear court
consensus has failed to emerge whether the common law should
be expanded in favor of responsibility. This article will provide
a brief history of the efforts to enlarge physician liability to third
parties. It will then focus on the cases that have arisen against
physicians by a third party injured in a motor vehicle accident
related to a patient’s medical condition or medication side-effects.
This is a dilemma confronting the courts on a regular basis.
K.R. was a troubled soul who suffered from depression,
recreational drug use, and questionable seizures. 1 Several
physicians prescribed various pharmaceuticals, some of which
are known to cause drowsiness. 2 She was told not to drive, but
this was not a significant concern because her boyfriend took her

1. K.R. is the driver’s initials who caused the accident, and a pseudonym
to protect her confidentiality because of a civil commitment. Bland v. K.R., No.
A-1837-18T1, 2020 WL 2510361, at *1 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15,
2020).
2. Id. at *4.
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everywhere. 3
On the day in question, K.R. saw a mental health counselor
and reported that she had “a history of blackouts and some
seizure episodes.” 4 K.R. was referred for a substance abuse
evaluation and diagnosed with depression and “many medical
issues.” 5 The patient left the facility, went to work, and then
met a friend at a restaurant; as she was driving home, she
drifted into the opposite lane of travel and struck the plaintiff’s
car, causing severe injuries. 6 K.R. pled guilty to unsafe driving,
and the injured motorist sued a variety of parties including
K.R.’s healthcare providers. 7 The pleading alleged that the
physicians were negligent in not reporting the woman to the
New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission because she had
recurrent episodes of unconsciousness, or impairment of driving
abilities. 8 The relevant statute provides that any physician
treating a patient for convulsive seizures, recurrent periods of
unconsciousness, or motor coordination impairment must report
that determination to the Director of the Division of Motor
Vehicles within twenty-four hours. 9
The trial judge dismissed the complaint noting that the
statute does not provide a private cause of action but merely
imposes a fine on the offending physician. 10 That failure to
report a seizure was also not the proximate cause of the
accident. 11 The New Jersey Appellate Court agreed and opined
that foreseeability is a critical component of a cause of action for
negligence. 12 Once this element is established, the court must
consider the fairness and policy considerations involved in
deciding whether the imposition of a duty is warranted. 13 This
determination is fact-specific and must lead to a fair and proper
disposition of the case. 14 However, a violation of the statute
3. Id.
4. Id. at *3.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:3-10.4 (2014).
10. Bland, 2020 WL 2510361, at *5.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *6.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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offers no foundation for a claim of negligence against a medical
care professional; it also does not generate a separate basis for a
common law claim for medical negligence. 15
This 2020 appellate court decision is just one of the latest
attempts to overturn the law that fails to extend a physician’s
duty to an injured third party who is not a patient. For decades,
this controversy has smoldered as the medical and legal
communities struggle over whether policy and fairness
considerations mandate the expansion of the law to impose
liability upon a healthcare provider for injuries sustained by a
third party that were foreseeable.
The first deviation of the rule occurred in 1976 when a
California court imposed a duty upon a mental health
professional to a third person when the analyst learned that a
patient would harm a specific person. 16 The next shoe to drop
involved the expanded liability of a physician to a third party
after exposure to a communicable disease due to the doctor’s
failure to report the positive results or the doctor’s negligent
explanation of the test’s outcome. 17 The most recent attempt to
expand a physician’s liability involves injuries sustained by
innocent third parties in motor vehicle accidents due to a
medical condition of or a medication prescribed to the offending
driver. 18 This article will provide a brief history of the efforts to
enlarge physician liability to third parties. It will then focus on
an analysis of the cases that have arisen to overturn the common
law doctrine of no liability to a third party injured by a patient
in a motor vehicle accident, in which the side-effects of
medication played a role.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The threshold question in a negligence case is whether there
was a duty owed. The claimant must demonstrate both the
requirement of and breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the
offending party, therefore creating tort liability. 19 It is well
15. Id. at *7.
16. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
17. E.g., Doe v. Cochran, 210 A.3d 469 (Conn. 2019).
18. Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323 (Tenn. 2003).
19. Collective Asset Partners LLC v. Schaumburg, 432 S.W.3d 435, 440
(Tex. App. 2014).
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recognized at common law that a physician owes a duty to advise
a patient, but is not mandated to take affirmative measures
outside the physician-patient relationship to shield a thirdparty. 20 Physicians may also be liable for oversight, or the
failure to safeguard a patient, due to a special relationship of
care they undertake, such as failing to correctly diagnose or
recommend a proper treatment plan. The usual criterion for
assessing a physician’s actions is the appropriate medical care
standard. 21 As noted in Rebollal v. Payne:
A physician and a health-related facility owe a
duty of care to their patients and to persons they
knew or reasonably should have known were
relying on them for this service to the patient.
However, the physician or health-related facility
does not undertake a duty to the public at large. 22
The duty to be responsible for malpractice to the patient is
based upon an expressed or implied contract that the physician
would treat the patient with the appropriate and necessary
professional skill. 23 For example, physicians frequently deliver
medical services in situations that do not always result in a
doctor-patient relationship. 24
The classic example is the
independent medical examination, whereby the physician
examines a person on behalf of an insurance carrier or defense
attorney. 25 Doctors also conduct physicals at an employers’
request or assess applicants’ health for life and disability
insurance policies. 26 Most states fail to recognize a doctorpatient relationship in these contexts and will not allow the
examinee to sue the presiding physician for malpractice. 27 This
is demonstrated in Smith v. Radecki, where the Alaska Supreme
Court did not permit the plaintiff to pursue a medical
20. Seebold v. Prison Health Servs., 57 A.3d 1232, 1238 n.6 (Pa. 2012).
21. Id. at 1247.
22. Rebollal v. Payne, 536 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
23. 3 SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D TORTS Physician’s Liability to Third Person §
37:54, Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2021).
24. Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. et al., A Guide to the Independent Medical
Examination, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 341 (2015).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 348.
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malpractice claim against an independent medical examiner
(“IME”) doctor for failing to discover the underlying cause of his
back problems. 28 The defendant determined there were no
permanent injuries related to the work-related incident, advised
against additional treatment, and suggested psychological
therapy and weight loss. 29 About one year later, an MRI
disclosed a sacral cyst that was compressing the nerves at the
base of his spine. 30 The employee sued the doctor for medical
malpractice for failing to diagnose and treat his back. 31 The
lawsuit was dismissed, and the appellate court affirmed this
decision. 32 The court ruled that the physician could not be held
liable because, as there was no doctor-patient relationship, there
was no corresponding duty of care. 33
II.

DUTY OWED BY MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

The scope of a patient’s right to confidentiality has been the
subject of debate since the time of Hippocrates, with some
advocating for complete disclosure and others pressing for
unconditional secrecy. 34 After all, confidentiality fosters open
discussions between parties that are protected from disclosure. 35
The foundations of this secrecy and the duty owed to a third
party in a mental health setting were rocked in the 1976 seminal
decision of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California. 36
This matter involved a patient who informed a University
psychotherapist that he would kill a woman he encountered at a
dance class when she returned from another country. 37 The
University police briefly detained that individual at the
therapist’s request, but later released him after he promised to
keep away from the young woman. 38 Tragically, he followed
28. Smith v. Radecki, 238 P.3d 111, 112 (Alaska 2010).
29. Id. at 113.
30. Id. at 112.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 114, 117.
33. Id.
34. See Ahmad Adi & Mohammad Mathbout, The Duty to Protect: Four
Decades After Tarasoff, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 6, 6 (2018).
35. See id.
36. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
37. Id. at 339.
38. Id.
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through on his threat and murdered the young woman upon her
return to the country. 39
A lawsuit was instituted by the young woman’s parents
claiming that the mental health worker had a duty to warn the
woman of the imminent danger posed by the patient. 40 The
defendant maintained that confidential communication is vital
to mental health treatment, and any information revealed
during a meeting must be held in the strictest confidence. 41 The
court disagreed and determined the policy supporting
confidential discussions must acquiesce in favor of disclosure
when necessary to prevent immediate harm to a third party; the
privilege of protection must terminate when a public peril
starts. 42 As the court noted:
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed
in such a position with regard to another . . . that
if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own
conduct . . . he would cause danger of injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to
use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. 43
The court opined that it will depart from the standard tort
principles only upon offsetting factors such as the foreseeability
of harm to a third party, the extent of certainty that the victim
suffered injury, the relationship between the assailant’s conduct
and the harm posed/suffered, the moral blame attached to that
conduct, “the policy of preventing future harm,” the scope of the
burden to the wrongdoer, and the significance to the community
of enforcing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for the
breach. 44 As noted in both the Restatement (Second) of Torts 45
and Prosser on Torts, 46 there is an exception to the general rule
of no liability to a third person when the mental health
professional stands in some special relationship to either the
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 342 (citation omitted).
Id. at 358.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
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patient whose actions must be controlled or in a relationship to
the foreseeable victim of that conduct. 47
This duty to warn is dubbed the “Tarasoff Rule” and
requires mental health workers to exercise “reasonable care” to
notify the authorities or warn possible victims should they learn
that a patient presents a threat to a third person. 48 The duty to
protect third parties has broad implications, and the holding
reinforces the principle that a doctor’s obligation of
confidentiality is not absolute. 49 The California legislature
subsequently refined the reach of Tarasoff by enacting a law
which imposes no financial responsibility against a
psychotherapist who fails to warn an individual who is
threatened by aggressive conduct unless the patient informs the
therapist of a serious threat of physical harm against a
reasonably identifiable victim. 50
This particular decision has become one of the most
discussed cases in modern tort law, and the courts and
legislatures have broadly embraced it as the basis for creating
an obligation upon mental health professionals to “warn, control,
and/or protect potential victims of their patients who have
expressed violent intentions.” 51 An increased focus on this duty
has recently emerged due to the mass shootings in Aurora,
Colorado and Newtown, Connecticut. For example, New York
has enacted legislation that imposes a mandatory obligation on
mental health professionals to report whenever they think
patients may present a risk to themselves or others. 52 Further,
such professionals are not subject to liability for the failure to
47. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343.
48. Adi & Mathbout, supra note 33, at 6.
49. Id.
50. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2012). This statute further states
that no monetary liability shall arise against a psychotherapist who, under the
circumstances of subsection (a) of the statute, discharges their duty to protect
by making a reasonable effort to notify the victim(s) and a law enforcement
agency. Id. In 2004, the California Court of Appeals extended the Tarasoff
holding to cases where a member of the patient’s family told the therapist that
the patient has made a serious threat against a third person. Ewing v.
Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
51. Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 98 (1994).
52. See Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mentalhealth-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.46
(McKinney 2013).
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report this type of conduct if they act “in good faith” and if the
police are permitted to remove firearms from the patients’
possession. 53
The range of disclosure requirements among the various
states is astounding. 54
Twenty-three jurisdictions have
statutorily required reporting laws, 55 eleven states must warn
at common-law, 56 ten states (and Washington D.C.) are
permissive concerning the duty to warn, 57 and six states offer no
guidance regarding the Tarasoff warnings. 58
III. THE SECOND WAVE OF CASES ESTABLISHING A DUTY TO
WARN
Many lawsuits have been filed since Tarasoff with the goal
of expanding health care providers’ liability to third parties.
These efforts have received mixed success, but a few areas have
gained traction. At the root of many of these cases is a policy
associated with social and economic considerations. As noted by
Dean Prosser in his description of proximate or legal causation:
Once it is established that the defendant’s conduct
has in fact been one of the causes of the plaintiff’s
injury, there remains the question whether the
defendant should be legally responsible for what
he has caused. Unlike the fact of causation, with
which it is often hopelessly confused, this is
essentially a problem of law. It is sometimes said
53. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.46(b), (d).
54. See Olga Gorshkalova & Sunil Munakomi, Duty to Warn, NAT’L CTR.
FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INFO.
(Sept.
5,
2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK542236/.
55. Jurisdictions in this category include Arizona, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Id.
56. Jurisdictions in this category include Alabama, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Iowa, North Carolina, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.
57. Jurisdictions in this category include Alaska, Connecticut,
Washington D.C., Florida, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
58. Jurisdictions in this category include Arkansas, Kansas, Maine,
Nevada, New Mexico, and North Dakota. Id.
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to be a question of whether the conduct has been
so significant and important a cause that the
defendant should be legally responsible. But both
significance
and
importance
turn
upon
conclusions in terms of legal policy, so that this
becomes essentially a question of whether the
policy of the law will extend the responsibility for
the conduct to the consequences which have in fact
occurred. 59
This thought process has led to the extension of liability to
a third party when the defendant has a special relationship with
either the individual whose actions need to be controlled or the
defendant is in a relationship with the target of the conduct,
which affords the victim a right to protection. 60
A. Communicable Diseases
The duty to warn has been recognized by the courts in the
context of contagious diseases, in which a cause of action has
been allowed by a third party who has been injured by the
doctor’s actions. 61 It is a basic principle that individuals owe a
duty to employ reasonable care to abstain from conduct that will
foreseeably injure others. 62 Many infectious diseases can be
transmitted through normal behaviors, and individual members
of society may be particularly susceptible to exposure and
unfavorable health consequences. 63 This risk has resulted in a
physician being held liable to those infected by a patient if the
physician negligently fails to properly diagnose an infectious
process or has identified the malady but neglects to warn others
within the foreseeable range of exposure to the disease. 64
59. Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hosp., Inc., 465 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. 1983)
(quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1978)).
60. See generally Emerich v. Phila. Ctr. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032
(Pa. 1998).
61. See id. at 1038.
62. Doe v. Linder Constr. Co., 845 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1992).
63. See Steven J. Alles, Duty to Warn in Pennsylvania, PA. STATE BD. MED.
(June
2011),
https://www.dos.pa.gov/ProfessionalLicensing/LicensingServices/2011/Medici
neJune2011-2.pdf.
64. See id. at *2; Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1984).
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The proper way of fulfilling this obligation to warn, and
avoiding liability, is influenced by appropriate reporting and
privacy laws. Some maintain that the patient’s confidentiality
is best safeguarded through indirect warnings provided to the
health department. However, this method may be unproductive
in states where the health agency does not warn those exposed
to communicable diseases such as HIV. 65
A human
immunodeficiency virus presents a particular problem because
the danger of contact is well-defined and direct, but people may
be hesitant to be tested if they know somebody will inform
acquaintances. 66 As a result, case law imposes a duty to issue a
warning to prevent harm to others. 67
Doe v. Cochran provides an example of this situation. 68 In
this case, the court ruled that a doctor who incorrectly tells a
patient that he does not have a sexually transmitted disease
may be liable to the patient’s partner for the resulting harm
when the physician is aware that the person requested testing
for the direct benefit of that partner. 69 As noted, a person owes
a duty to act with “due care in one’s affirmative conduct with
respect to all people, insofar as one’s negligent actions may
foreseeably harm them.” 70
Based upon the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
One who negligently gives false information to
another is subject to liability for physical harm
caused by action taken by the other in reasonable
reliance upon such information, where such harm
results . . . to such third persons as the actor
should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken. 71

65. See Edward P. Richards & Katharine C. Rathbun, Warning Third
Parties, in LAW AND THE PHYSICIAN: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1993) (ebook).
66. See Laura Lin & Bryan A. Liang, HIV and Health Law: Striking the
Balance Between Legal Mandates and Medical Ethics, 7 AM. MED. ASS’N J.
ETHICS 687, 688 (2005).
67. See id.
68. Doe v. Cochran, 210 A.3d 469 (Conn. 2019).
69. Id. at 472.
70. Id. at 478.
71. Id. at 481 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (AM. L. INST.
1965)).
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In this case, the partner was a foreseeable victim of the
physician’s negligence to an identifiable person.
This ruling is consistent with several other jurisdictions
that have found a medical professional’s obligation to accurately
diagnose and properly inform a patient who has an infectious
disease encompasses not only the patient but also third persons
who may foreseeably develop that disease from the patient. 72
This principle is not draconian or unforeseeable. Many courts
have long found that health care providers owe a duty of care to
members of the infected patient’s immediate family. 73
In the context of HIV, state laws are inconsistent as to
whether a patient’s status can be shared with others. Several
jurisdictions have laws dealing with notifying contacts of HIV
exposure, and certain health departments mandate that if a
patient declines to report a companion who may have been
exposed, the physician must inform the appropriate
governmental agency of any partner of whom the doctor is
aware. 74 Some states also have laws requiring a duty to warn,
thereby mandating disclosure by the health care provider to
others known to be at substantial danger for future HIV
transmission from patients identified as being infected. 75
In Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt University, a woman
received blood transfusions during surgery, but she was never
told the transfusion could expose her to the HIV virus. 76
Subsequently, the patient gave birth to a daughter infected with
HIV who died from complications related to the virus. The
woman and her husband subsequently filed suit against the
hospital, the defendant’s summary judgment motion was
granted, and an appeal followed. 77 The appellate court noted a
72. Id. at 485; see 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers
§ 226, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021); Lawrence O. Gostin & James G.
Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually
Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner
Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 9, 37 (1998); Tracy A. Bateman,
Liability of Doctor or Other Health Practitioner to Third Party Contracting
Contagious Disease from Doctor's Patient, 3 A.L.R. 5th § 2(a) (1992); 43 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Physician’s Failure to Protect Third Party From Harm
by Nonpsychiatric Patient § 3, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020).
73. See Cochran, 210 A.3d at 485.
74. Lin & Liang, supra note 64, at *2.
75. Id.
76. Est. of Amos v. Vanderbilt Univ., 62 S.W.3d 133, 135 (Tenn. 2001).
77. Id. at 135–36.
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recognized concept that “a physician may owe a duty to a nonpatient third party if the physician’s negligence causes
reasonably foreseeable injuries to the third party.” 78 In finding
for the plaintiffs, the court stated that the duty envisioned is to
warn the patient of the HIV risk in order for the patient to take
proper measures to avoid transmission of the virus to both her
husband and child. 79 The defendant’s breach of that duty
resulted in the reasonably foreseeable injuries incurred by the
deceased infant. 80
B. Genetic Risks
Genetic testing has implications beyond the patient, such as
disclosing valuable health information to the person’s
relatives. 81 The failure to share inheritable genetic information
may “lead to harm, particularly when knowledge could result in
avoidance, treatment, or prevention of a genetic condition or in
significant changes to reproductive choices or lifestyle.” 82 A
physician’s duty to inform at-risk relatives of a genetically
transmittable disease is a troubling question confronting
physicians who order these tests. 83
Generally, there is no duty on the part of a doctor to warn
family members of a genetic characteristic unless the patient
expressly gives permission because another family member
would be considered a “third party.” This need to protect genetic
information relates back to the Hippocratic Oath and is
reinforced by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act. 84
Recent events have caused the medical profession to
reconsider traditional ideas of confidentiality and move in favor
of disclosure. At-risk relatives have an obvious concern in
78. Id. at 138.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Does a Physician Have a Duty to Inform AtRisk Relatives of a Positive Genetic Test When the Patient Refuses to Allow That
Disclosure?, 16 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 127, 127–52 (2020).
82. Sara Taub et al., Managing Familial Risk in Genetic Testing, 8
GENETIC TESTING 356, 358 (2004) (weighing duty to disclose against obligation
to protect patient confidentiality).
83. See Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 128.
84. Id. at 135.

13

162

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 41.2

learning about their health risks, particularly those traits that
can be reduced through preventive care. 85 Florida became the
first state to consider genetic information disclosure to a nonpatient in Pate v. Threlkel. 86 The court framed the issue as
whether “a physician owe[s] a duty of care to the children of a
patient to warn the patient of the genetically transferable nature
of the condition for which the physician is treating the
patient?” 87 The facts reveal that a patient was examined for
medullary thyroid carcinoma, a genetically transferable disease.
A few years later, the patient’s daughter was discovered to have
the same illness. 88 As a result, the child sued the physicians who
had treated her mother, asserting that they knew or should have
known the patient’s children had the potential of inheriting the
dangerous malady and that the doctor had an obligation to warn
the offspring. 89 The physicians moved to dismiss the lawsuit,
maintaining that the plaintiff did not have a doctor-patient
relationship with them, so they had no duty to inform her. 90 The
lower court concurred and dismissed the claim. 91 It found that
no duty existed because the plaintiff was not in the foreseeable
zone of risk, and the rules of privity applied. 92
This determination was reversed on appeal. 93 The court
opined that a duty is established if a reasonably prudent
physician would have informed the patient of a genetically
communicable illness for which the doctor was treating the
person. 94 In this matter, the standard of care was germane to
both the patient and her children, who were identifiable third
parties within the zone of danger. 95 However, the court stated
the duty to warn was satisfied by telling the patient of the risk. 96
85. Id. at 138.
86. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (“[I]n any
circumstances in which the physician has a duty to warn of a genetically
transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning the patient.”).
87. Id. at 279; see Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 128.
88. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 279.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 279–80.
91. Id.; Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 143–44.
92. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 279–80.
93. Id. at 282.
94. Id. at 280–82.
95. Id. at 282.
96. Id.
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It noted that its decision should not be construed to require the
physician to warn at-risk children of the problem. 97 After all,
patients are expected to tell their family members about genetic
information. 98
New Jersey addressed this issue in Safer v. Estate of Pack. 99
The physician in question treated the plaintiff’s father years
earlier for retroperitoneal cancer, resulting in a total
colectomy. 100 Subsequently, the father developed ulcerative
adenocarcinoma with metastases that caused his death. 101
Years later, the plaintiff suffered from abdominal pain and was
found to have a cancerous blockage of the colon requiring
surgery and chemotherapy. 102 A review of the father’s medical
records showed that he had the same cancerous malady. 103 The
daughter instituted a suit against her father’s doctor, claiming
that the physician had a duty to warn those relatives at risk of
developing the problem since early scrutiny could have
prevented the inherited cancer outcome. 104
The appellate court ruled that a physician is mandated to
disclose a genetic condition to those at risk. 105 This duty applies
to the patient and immediate family members who might be
adversely affected by the breach of that duty. However, the
ruling’s impact must be considered in view of ensuing legislation
passed in New Jersey that provides that genetic information
may not be revealed except in specific situations such as for
purposes of a criminal investigation, to ascertain paternity, and
when authorized by a court order. 106 The statute does not
provide for the sharing of genetic information with at-risk
relatives without consent. 107
The cases involving the disclosure of genetic information

97. Id. at 282.
98. Id.
99. Safer v. Est. of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
100. Id. at 1189.
101. Id. at 1190.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1193.
106. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-47 (West 1996) (setting conditions for
disclosure of genetic information).
107. Id.
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continued with the Minnesota matter of Molloy v. Meier. 108 In
this litigation, the court was again asked to consider the
disclosure of genetic information. 109 This malpractice lawsuit
concerned the defendants’ failure to find a genetic abnormality
in the plaintiffs’ daughter, thereby causing the parents to have
a second child with the same illness. 110 The doctor was asked to
run genetic tests but did not perform the full complement of
diagnostic aids. 111 The parents then inquired about whether
another child’s birth would produce an offspring that would be
mentally delayed, and they were told that the odds of this
occurring were slim. 112
Based upon that advice, the plaintiffs had another baby who
showed developmental difficulties. 113 Additional testing was
positive for Fragile X syndrome, and the parents sued the
defendants asserting that the doctors failed to obtain the proper
tests, mistakenly noting that the first child had been fully
tested, and failed to inform the plaintiffs about the possibility of
passing along an inheritable genetic abnormality to subsequent
children. 114 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint,
asserting that they did not owe a duty to the patient’s family. 115
The court framed the issue on appeal as follows: “Does a
physician who allegedly fails to test for and diagnose a genetic
disorder in an existing child leading to the birth of a subsequent
child with that disorder owe a legal duty to the child’s
parents?” 116 The court found in favor of the plaintiffs and noted
that genetics affects more than just the patient. 117 Both the
parents and child benefit from appropriate testing, and each can
be injured by a mistake. Therefore, a physician’s duty regarding
genetic testing goes beyond just the patient and extends to the
biological parents who may be foreseeably harmed by a violation
of that duty. 118 The defendants should have anticipated that
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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See Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 146.
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parents might wish to have another child because of the lack of
information about a positive genetic disorder. 119
The duty to disclose a genetic risk to a third person is
similar to the liability imposed against a physician for failing to
inform non-patient family members about the harm linked to a
patient with a contagious disease. 120 As noted in Molloy v. Meier,
the court found that “genetic testing and diagnosis does not
affect only the patient. Both the patient and her family can
benefit from accurate testing and diagnosis.” 121
C. Independent Medical Examinations
Jurisdictions have varied approaches in ascertaining
whether an independent medical examiner owes a duty of care
to the examinee. This issue of duties owed is significant because
it affects whether a claimant can maintain a malpractice or
other professional negligence suit against the independent
examiner who was not hired by the patient. 122 Most jurisdictions
hold no doctor-patient relationship is formed, but some courts
have ruled that an IME doctor owes the patient a limited duty
i.e., that a doctor-patient relationship does exist. 123
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) started the ball
rolling when it opined that a physician who conducts an isolated
examination of a person’s health or disability for an employer,
business, or insurer should be found to have created a limited
patient-physician relationship. 124 The AMA further noted that
this limited relationship obliges physicians to tell the patient
about important health information and suggests that they
follow up with their own physician. 125 However, the IME is not
obliged to treat the individual like they would handle their
119. Id.
120. See Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 150.
121. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 719.
122. See Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 149.
123. Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 23, at 342.
124. Am. Med. Ass’n, Patient-Physician Relationship in the Context of
Work-Related and Independent Medical Examinations, Opinion 10.03 (Dec.
1999), available
at
https://www.patrickmalonelaw.com/usefulinformation/legal-resources/attorneys/legal-resources-attorneys-injuredclients/american-medical-association/ (explaining that “isolated assessment[s]
of an individual's health” for a third party creates a “limited patient-physician
relationship”).
125. Id.
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patients. 126 The AMA also reported that the physician must
inform the examinee of any abnormalities and other significant
findings discovered as the result of the physical, including
making sure that the patient comprehends the issue. 127
Nevertheless, courts have not uniformly adopted the AMA’s
opinion. 128
Some states do not have a bright-line standard about an
IME’s duty to examinees. Instead, they have found that an
independent examiner owes a limited duty that does not rise to
the doctor-patient relationship’s standard duty. 129 For example,
the Virginia Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to defeat a
motion to dismiss a medical malpractice claim against an
examiner. 130 In Harris v. Kreutzer, the plaintiff sustained a
brain injury in an automobile accident and sued the other
driver. 131 The trial judge ordered Harris to undergo an
independent medical examination to assess the extent of her
brain injury. 132 The doctor was a clinical psychologist, and it
was claimed that he was verbally abusive to the plaintiff and
accused her of faking the injuries. 133 Ms. Harris filed a
malpractice suit, and the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the
negligent performance of a physical or mental independent
medical examination provides a possible cause of action. 134 It
was alleged that the doctor knew that her psychological disorder
would be exasperated if she were verbally mistreated during the
exam. 135 Herclaim was premised on the allegation that the
doctor intentionally aggravated her pre-existing problems,
which he knew of, and as a result of his behavior during the
examination, her health significantly deteriorated. 136 The court
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Smith v. Radecki, 238 P.3d 111, 115–16 (Alaska
2010) (discussing the various approaches state courts have taken to the AMA
rule).
129. See Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 23, at 344.
130. Harris v. Kreutzer, 624 S.E.2d 24 (Va. 2006).
131. Id. at 29–30 (explaining that there “has not been [a] uniform” method
for determining whether a physician owes a duty to a patient in a court
ordered medical examination).
132. Id. at 27.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 33.
135. Id. at 27.
136. Id.
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determined that an independent medical examination does not
establish the traditional doctor-patient relationship, but rather
a limited relationship; “[t]he recognition of a limited relationship
preserves the principle that the IME physician has undertaken
limited duties but that he has done so in a situation where he is
‘expected to exercise reasonable care commensurate with his
experience and training.’” 137
Both Texas and Minnesota courts hold that the independent
physician owes a limited duty to an examinee to perform the
examination correctly without causing further harm to the
patient. 138 Likewise, New Jersey has determined that an IME
owes a duty to the claimant if the physician is examining a
specific complaint. 139 The Fifth Circuit has opined that a doctor
hired by a third party to perform an examination must tell the
patient of a potentially life-threatening issue discovered during
the physical. 140 The Ninth Circuit has determined that an IME
has a duty under Washington law to notify those examined of
abnormal test findings, even in the absence of the doctor-patient
relationship. 141
A handful of jurisdictions find that an IME establishes a
doctor-patient relationship sufficient for a malpractice claim
against a physician. 142 For instance, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that Louisiana law created a doctor-patient
relationship. 143 In Green v. Walker, the decedent’s estate filed a
claim after the patient died from lung cancer. 144 The facts show
that the deceased had an annual physical, a condition of his
job. 145 The physician found the man to be in good health and
allowed him to continue working. 146 A year later, he was
diagnosed with lung cancer and subsequently died. 147 The
137. Id. at 31 (quoting Dyer v. Trachtman, 679 N.W.2d 311, 316 (Mich.
2004)).
138. See Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 23, at 344–45.
139. Reed v. Bojarski, 764 A.2d 433, 442–43 (N.J. 2001) (holding that preemployment medical exams created a duty).
140. Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1990).
141. Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991).
142. See Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 23, at 345–47.
143. Green, 910 F.2d at 296.
144. Id. at 292.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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lawsuit was premised upon the physician’s failure to diagnose
the deceased’s lung cancer at the employee-mandated
evaluation. 148 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claim
because there was no doctor-patient relationship. 149 The Fifth
Circuit disagreed and opined:
We therefore now hold that when an individual is
required, as a condition of future or continued
employment, to submit to a medical examination,
that examination creates a relationship between
the examining physician and the examinee, at
least to the extent of the tests conducted. This
relationship imposes upon the examining
physician a duty to conduct the requested tests
and diagnose the results thereof, exercising the
level of care consistent with the doctor’s
professional training and expertise, and to take
reasonable steps to make information available
timely to the examinee of any findings that pose
an imminent danger to the examinee’s physical or
mental well-being. 150
The Kansas courts have found that a doctor hired to conduct
an independent medical examination must not cause harm
during the physical and must use her best judgment in
treatment while relying on her skill and experience. 151 In
Maryland, a claimant must demonstrate that a doctor-patient
relationship was established to maintain a malpractice claim. 152
The leading case in Maryland held that a doctor-patient
relationship is established, “only . . . as a result of a contract,
express or implied, that the doctor will treat the patient with
proper professional skill and the patient will pay for such
treatment.” 153
In Webb v. T.D., the Montana Supreme Court ruled that a

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
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patient could sue her IME doctor for malpractice. 154 The court
framed the issue as “whether a physician who performs a
medical examination of an individual at the request of a third
party has a duty of care to the examinee and, if so, what is the
scope of that duty?” 155 The plaintiff hurt her spine in a workrelated incident and was treated by a chiropractor and physical
therapist. 156 The defendant was the only medical doctor she
saw, and her job’s insurance company employed the physician. 157
That individual ordered a CT scan to determine whether the
worker had a herniated disk and was told that she did not and
could return to work. 158 The claimant went back to her job only
to herniate a disc, which caused physical limitations. 159 The
worker filed a malpractice claim against the defendant, who
moved to dismiss the lawsuit arguing that he was not employed
to provide any treatment and therefore did not owe a duty
because there was no doctor-patient relationship. 160
The Montana Supreme Court disagreed and found that
when a person is mandated, as a condition of employment, to
submit to an examination, that physical examination
establishes a doctor-patient relationship, at least to the degree
of the tests conducted. 161 This connection creates a duty upon
the doctor to perform the tests and diagnose the results, using
the care consistent with the doctor’s professional training and
expertise. 162 That duty is not the same as that which is owed in
the standard doctor-patient relationship, but will be ascertained
on a case-by-case basis. 163 This means that the physician must
exercise reasonable care to discover conditions that pose an
imminent danger to the patient’s health, take the necessary
steps to inform the patient of those conditions, and properly
notify the patient of his or her status after the examination with

154. Webb v. T.D., 951 P.2d 1008, 1014 (Mont. 1997) (holding that
Montana law imposed a duty on a doctor performing an IME).
155. Id. at 1009.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1009–10.
158. Id. at 1010.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1014.
162. Id. at 1013–14.
163. Id. at 1014.
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advice appropriate to the doctor’s profession. 164
IV. PHYSICIAN’S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY
PATIENTS IN ACCIDENTS
Informed consent is a critical aspect of shared decisionmaking and necessitates that a patient be informed of the
advantages, risks, and alternatives to any medical procedure.
This process, which has become part of both the law and practice
of every physician, helps a patient determine whether to proceed
with the proposed treatment. 165 The doctrine’s basis is the
ethical idea of patient autonomy and fundamental human
rights. 166 The principle is based upon the benefit that surfaces
from a person’s active involvement in the decision-making
process about their health. 167 This participation is helpful
because it aids in preventing treatment that a patient believes
is disadvantaged or unwarranted. 168
Informed consent has recently gained traction as a way to
require healthcare providers to warn patients of the side effects
of dispensed or prescribed medications. 169 The courts have
uniformly recognized the principle as a way to establish a duty
of care owed to the patient that will give rise to tort liability. 170
However, there is a growing trend to apply the concept to a nonpatient third party to show that a physician was negligent by
violating a statute created to protect the public through
negligence per se, establishing prima facie negligence, or
offering evidence of carelessness. 171 In other words, just as
safety laws create a duty that protects injured parties, informed
consent may be used to show a duty owed by a healthcare
provider to a patient that could be applied towards third parties
164. Id.
165. See Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. & Maria Zambrano Steinhaus, The EverChanging Landscape of Informed Consent and Whether the Obligation to
Explain a Procedure to the Patient May Be Delegated, 71 ARK. L. REV. 727
(2019).
166. Id. at 727–28.
167. Id. at 729.
168. Id.
169. See 43 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Physician’s Failure to Protect
Third Party From Harm by Nonpsychiatric Patient § 1, Westlaw (database
updated Nov. 2020).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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injured by that patient. 172 This is demonstrated by a series of
cases dealing with physician liability to a third party injured by
a patient-driver who was impaired by a medical problem or
prescription drugs. 173
These matters usually involve control and foreseeability
issues, and the “cases lend themselves to a public policy
analysis.” 174 The courts like to apply a balancing test when
confronting questions about expanding a physician’s liability to
a third party. This requires the court to evaluate the probability
of injury in similar matters, to weigh the doctor’s burden to
guard against liability, and to examine the possible concerns of
putting that burden on the doctor. 175 The courts will also
consider the concept of fairness; an unreasonable risk is present
if “the foreseeable probability and gravity of harm posed by
defendant’s conduct outweigh the burden upon the defendant to
engage in alternative conduct that would have prevented the
harm.” 176 When it comes to prescribing drugs, the obligation to
inform a patient of the risks related to taking medication while
operating a motor vehicle presents little to no burden upon a
doctor when associated with the degree of harm that the
warning may prevent to a third party. 177
Overall, courts are split over whether to extend a
physician’s liability in these cases. The soundest situation for
establishing a duty of care for medication, epilepsy, and similar
conditions occurs when the doctor creates an unreasonable risk
to a third party by negligently risking harm to the patient. This
is demonstrated by a patient who is permitted to operate a car,
but because of the physician’s issuance of unneeded or
unsuitable medication, the driver becomes drowsy and strikes
the plaintiff’s vehicle. Some courts have recognized a duty of
172. Id.
173. See Dean P. Nicastro, Physician Liability to Non-Patients: Coombes
v. Florio, 450 Mass. 182 (2007), 52 BOS. BAR J. 20 (2008).
174. Reply Brief of Appellee at 27, Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887 (Ala.
2004) (No. 1011673).
175. See id.; Lance v. Senior, 224 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. 1967); Boyd v. Racine
Currency Exch., Inc., 306 N.E.2d 39 (Ill. 1973).
176. Campbell C. Steele, Comment, Torts-Burroughs v. Magee: The
Tennessee Supreme Court Extends a Physician’s Duty to the Motoring Public to
Warn Patients of the Effects of Taking Medication While Driving but Declines
to Extend a Duty to Third Parties for Negligent Prescription Decisions, 35 U.
MEM. L. REV. 173, 176–77 (2004) (citations omitted).
177. See id. at 195.
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care to a third party in such situations. 178 Likewise, the
healthcare provider may be liable for carelessly failing to
discover a patient’s epilepsy, to warn the medicated patient
against driving, or to inform the patient-driver the
contraindicated drug given by a doctor incapacitates when
driving. 179 While a physician may owe a duty to foreseeable
third persons to inform a patient of the “risks of driving while
under the influence of [] prescribed drugs,” that obligation is not
always owed to foreseeable third persons when electing to
prescribe pharmaceuticals to a patient. 180 Needless to say,
physicians and medical organizations are strenuously opposed
to the expansion of liability to cover third parties injured
because of medication use by patients, 181 and several courts
agree with this position. 182 Some jurisdictions merely refuse to
extend liability to non-patients. 183 Others opine that creating a
duty to non-patients will create a conflict between a physician’s
responsibilities to a patient and obligations to third parties. 184
However, these positions are not applicable when the doctor’s
duty of care requires an identical diagnosis or treatment that
would also be safer for society members. 185 In such a case, there
is neither a clash of allegiance nor any further imposition upon
the doctor; she fulfills her obligation to a third person when she
meets her duty to the patient. 186
Most individuals handle prescription medication with care.
Pharmaceuticals have side effects because of their chemical
structure that may influence a person’s capacity to engage in
178. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 149–52 (2d ed. 2011)
(discussing § 289 regarding the risk to strangers when physicians fail to
properly warn or treat their patients).
179. See id.; see also Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 2004); Cheeks
v. Dorsey, 846 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (methadone
allegedly issued to patient already on drugs, causing an incapacity that
resulted in a car accident that killed the plaintiff's decedent and her child).
180. Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 333–35 (Tenn. 2003).
181. See Chris Mazzolini, Physician Found Liable for Malpractice for
ECON.
(May
14,
2019),
Patient
He
Never
Treated,
MED.
https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/physician-found-liable-malpracticepatient-he-never-treated.
182. See id.
183. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 176, at 150–52.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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activities. 187 These adverse reactions can range from nausea to
the inability to operate a car or heavy equipment. 188 To
minimize these effects, patients must be warned about
significant safety concerns and side effects that create a risk. 189
This information allows patients to choose whether to take the
drug at a particular time or ensure they are used correctly. But
who should assume the obligation of providing patients with this
information? 190 The courts are split as to that question and lean
towards a middle position of either making physicians
responsible or placing the burden on patients themselves. 191
Litigation in which courts have had to decide a physician’s
liability to a non-patient generally involves motor vehicular
accidents and includes circumstances where a medicated patient
negligently uses a car and causes an accident. 192
A. Cases That Have Allowed Recovery
Courts that have allowed recovery tend to look at
foreseeability as a key component in establishing a duty of care,
or they state public policy is the overriding consideration making
a physician responsible for the actions of the patient.
1. Alabama
The Alabama Supreme Court found that a duty was owed to
an injured third party in a motor vehicle accident in Taylor v.
Smith. 193 The facts demonstrate that Ms. Ennis visited the
defendant’s clinic for treatment of an opiate addiction. 194 She
was given methadone, but random testing showed that the
187. See Cherie N. Wyatt, Driving the Center Line: Missouri Physicians’
Potential Liability to Third Persons for Failing to Warn of Medication Side
Effects, 46 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 873
(2002).
188. See Carol DerSarkissian, Drug Side Effects Explained, WEBMD
(Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/drug-side-effectsexplained#1.
189. See Michael Bihari, Why You Should Pay Attention to Black Box
Warnings
on
Medication,
VERYWELLHEALTH
(Mar.
1,
2020),
https://www.verywellhealth.com/black-box-warnings-1124107.
190. See Wyatt, supra note 185, at 873.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887, 897 (Ala. 2004).
194. Id. at 889.
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patient was still using drugs. 195 Following a treatment session,
the patient left the clinic and drove home. 196 Her car crossed
into the opposite lane of travel and struck the automobile
containing the plaintiff. 197 A suit was filed by plaintiff against
defendant-physician, claiming the defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff under ordinary negligence principles to not allow his
impaired patient, who could not operate a motor vehicle
responsibly, to be discharged. 198
The court noted that based upon the distance and frequency
the patient traveled to the clinic and her continued drug abuse,
a car accident was reasonably foreseeable. 199 Thus, the issue
was whether the head of a drug-treatment center owed a duty to
a non-patient who was hurt in an accident with the patient when
it was reasonably foreseeable that an accident can occur from
the physician’s failure to use due care in giving methadone to
the patient. 200 In finding liability, the court stated “every person
owes every other person a duty imposed by law to be careful not
to hurt him,” and the court has often recognized a foreseeable
duty to third parties based on a “obligation imposed in tort to act
reasonably.” 201 The court then examined other jurisdictions that
imposed such a duty ondoctorsto benefit non-patient members of
the driving public. 202 As was explained:
The possibility (or perhaps what could be called a
threat) that in some case or cases in the future
some therapists may choose not to accept some
potential patients for therapy in their private
practice . . . should not forever preclude victims of
torts . . . referable to the breach of duty of such
therapists from being without any remedy
whatever. 203
195. Id. at 890.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 890–91.
199. Id. at 892.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 893 (quoting Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence
Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496, 502 (Ala. 1984)).
202. Id. at 893–95.
203. Id. at 896 (quoting Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 372 (Tex. App.
1983)).
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The alleged “nature of the defendant’s activity,” and the
issuing of methadone on an outpatient basis without taking
appropriate safeguards, “[are] affirmative act[s],” which place
the administering doctor directly in the foreseeable results; this
element, by itself, provides the incentive for imposing a duty. 204
2. Hawaii
The Hawaii Supreme Court issued a mixed ruling in
McKenzie v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, Inc. 205 It
determined a doctor did not owe a duty to a third party injured
from prescribing medication that is not a controlled
substance. 206 However, a duty is imposed upon a physician to
someone other than the patient to warn the patient a drug may
affect that person’s driving capabilities if the patient could not
have reasonably known the risk. 207 This decision, which has
been discussed by other jurisdictions, involved a patient who had
a fainting episode from medication issued by the defendant
while operating a car that struck the minor plaintiff. 208
The defendant argued that he owed no duty to the plaintiff
because she was not his patient and that there was no special
relationship with the patient that would require him to control
that person’s behavior. 209 The plaintiff countered that the
pertinent issue is foreseeability, and public policy requires
physicians to be held accountable for their prescribing
practices. 210 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
defendant could be liable to the plaintiff because it is foreseeable
that the patient would drive after taking negligently issued
medication, subjecting them to harm. 211
However, the
Restatement merely describes a form of negligent conduct; it

204. Id. at 896–97.
205. McKenzie v. Haw. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 47 P.3d 1209 (Haw.
2002).
206. Id. at 1221.
207. Id. at 1210.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1211–12.
210. Id. at 1212.
211. Id. at 1213 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 (AM. L.
INST. 1965)).
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does not create a legal duty. 212
In ascertaining whether a duty is owed, the court must
weigh the policy considerations that favor each party. The
plaintiff asserts that the fair distribution of the costs of harm
and the need for objective compensation to those injured
requires that health care providers owe a duty to non-patient
third parties hurt due to negligent prescribing practices. 213
However, prescribing decisions require a weighing of the
benefits and risks to a patient. 214 In this regard, the threat of
litigation should be sufficient to dissuade negligent prescribing
decisions. 215
Setting aside issues involving controlled
substances, the court opined that “a physician does not owe a
duty to non-patient third parties injured in an automobile
accident caused by the patient’s adverse reaction to a medication
negligently prescribed by the physician . . . where the negligence
involves prescribing decisions.” 216
As for a physician’s negligent failure to warn a patient of a
drug’s dangerous side-effects, such a warning could potentially
avoid substantial harm to third parties. “There is ‘little [social]
utility in failing to warn patients about the effects of a drug or
condition that are known to the physician but are likely to be
unknown to the patient.’” 217 Balancing the factors involved in
imposing a duty to warn about the dangers of medication, logic
imposes upon physicians, for the benefit of third parties, a duty
to tell their patients that a drug may impair their driving ability
“when such a duty would otherwise be owed to the patient.” 218
Factors to ponder in deciding whether the reasonable patient
should have known of the risk include (1) understanding the risk
as between laypersons and doctors; (2) whether the patient has
previously taken the drug and/or suffered adverse effects; and
(3) whether a warning would otherwise have been useless. 219

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
1998)).
218.
219.
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Id. at 1213–14 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302).
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1219 (quoting Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex.
McKenzie, 47 P.3d at 1221.
Id. at 1222.
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3. Indiana
Indiana has considered the issue of physician liability to
third parties on several occasions. In Cram v. Howell, the
Indiana Supreme Court reversed the Indiana Court of Appeals,
holding that a physician owes no duty to a third person allegedly
harmed by the doctor’s treatment of a patient. 220 Years earlier,
the court found that no malpractice liability was established
against a physician who had prescribed anabolic steroids to a
patient who developed a toxic psychosis from the drug that
caused him to shoot a third party. 221 The court used a balancing
test to make this determination. 222 Generally, physicians do not
owe a duty to a non-patient injured by the doctor’s treatment of
a patient.
However, this pronouncement does provide
physicians with complete immunity against third person claims.
Liability may attach under the proper factual situation. 223 The
case presented facts that implied the defendant had actual
knowledge that his immunizations caused a recurrent loss of
consciousness in the patient. 224 This knowledge makes it likely
that the patient, if permitted to drive, would injure a third
party. 225 From a public policy point of view, the defendant
should have observed his patient for an appropriate time period
before allowing him to leave the office, and the physician failed
to warn the patient of the risks linked to operating a vehicle in
such a state. 226
This logic was reinforced in Manley v. Sherer. 227 In that
case, the plaintiff was involved in a car accident when the
defendant’s patient lost consciousness while driving because of
a medical condition and pharmaceuticals prescribed by the
physician. 228 While the plaintiff had no special relationship with
the defendant, it was reasonably foreseeable that the patient
could lose consciousness while driving and pose a danger to
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Cram v. Howell, 680 N.E.2d 1096, 1096 (Ind. 1997).
Id. at 1097 (citing Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1997)).
Id. at 1097 (citing Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 997)).
Id. at 1097–98.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id.
See Manley v. Sherer, 960 N.E.2d 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 819.
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others with her medical condition and prescribed medication. 229
Public policy considerations also warrant the imposition of a
duty to warn since it will benefit both similarly-situated patients
and third parties who may encounter those patients on the
highway. 230
4. New York
New York considered a physician’s liability to a third party
in Davis v. South Nassau Community Hospital. 231 This matter
involved a patient who was given a narcotic pain-killer by the
defendant without notice that the medication could impair her
ability to drive. 232 Soon after she left the defendant’s facility,
while allegedly impaired by the drug, she was involved in an
accident when she struck a bus driven by the plaintiff. 233 The
court phrased the issue as to whether the defendant owed a duty
to the plaintiff to warn the patient that the drugs the physician
gave her either impaired or could have impaired her ability to
operate a motor vehicle properly. 234
In finding that such a duty exists, the court noted that it has
“historically proceeded carefully and with reluctance to expand
an existing duty of care.” 235 However, in limited situations, the
court has enlarged the duty of a treating physician to include a
third party whose personal injury stemmed from the doctor’s
performance of the duty of care owed to the patient. 236 In this
matter, the physician’s “relationship with . . . the tortfeasor . . .
place[s] [him] in the [most advantageous] position to [safeguard]
against the risk of harm.” 237 When one weighs the elements
“such as the expectations of the parties and society . . . tilts in
favor of establishing a duty running from defendants to
plaintiffs under the facts alleged in this case.” 238 Giving the drug
229. Id. at 822.
230. Id. at 822–23.
231. Davis v. S. Nassau Communities Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 614 (N.Y. 2015).
232. Id. at 616.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 619 (citation omitted).
236. Id. at 621.
237. Id. at 622 (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d
1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001)).
238. Id.
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at issue without warning the patient about the medication’s
ability to confuse created a danger affecting every motorist in
the patient’s locale. 239 The physician is the only party who could
have delivered an appropriate admonition of the effects of that
prescription. 240 Therefore, the defendant had an obligation to
the plaintiff to warn the patient that the medication reduced her
ability to safely operate a car. 241
5. South Carolina
Hardee v. Bio-Medical Applications of South Carolina, Inc.
involved a patient who was returning home from dialysis when
he lost control of her car and collided with the plaintiff. 242 It was
alleged that the defendant failed to inform the patient of the ill
effects from the dialysis treatment—he was suffering from low
blood sugar at the time the patient left the defendant’s office,
and the medical staff failed to complete the normal posttreatment tests before releasing the individual. 243
The court reversed the defendant’s grant of summary
judgment and found that a doctor-patient relationship is not
necessary in every claim against a medical provider, and a
physician’s malpractice in treating a patient may provide the
foundation of such an action by a third person in limited
circumstances. 244 A physician has a duty to warn of the risks
involved with medical care. A medical provider who offers
treatment which may adversely influence a patient’s abilities
owes a duty to avoid harm to the patient and to reasonably
identifiable third parties by notifying the patient of the risks
before dispensing treatment. 245 Therefore, if the physician knew
that the patient could suffer harmful effects subsequent to
dialysis, the defendant owed a duty to a third party to warn the
patient of the dangers of driving. 246

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Hardee v. Bio-Medical Applications of S.C., Inc., 636 S.E.2d 629, 630
(S.C. 2006).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 632.
245. Id. at 631–32.
246. Id. at 632.
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6. Tennessee
Burroughs v. Magee involved a fatal motor vehicle accident
when a truck driver ran a stop sign and collided with the
plaintiff’s car. 247 Mrs. Burroughs was seriously injured, and her
husband was killed. 248 The day before the incident, the truck
driver had visited the defendant for persistent headaches, and
the doctor had prescribed various medications that depress the
nervous system and affect a person’s ability to drive. 249 The
plaintiffs sued, claiming that the defendant was negligent in
failing to properly review the truck driver’s medical history
outlined in the medical chart. 250 It was asserted that: (1) the
truck driver had a known history of Soma abuse, an addictive
and potentially dangerous muscle relaxer, and the physician
was negligent in prescribing that medication; and (2) the
defendant negligently failed to warn his patient against
operating a vehicle while taking the drug. 251 The trial court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the
matter ended up before the Tennessee Supreme Court. 252
The court used a complex analysis to determine that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiffs to warn his patient of the
dangers of driving while under the influence of the prescribed
medication. 253 However, it then found that the physician had no
duty to the plaintiffs in the determination of whether to give the
medications to the patient. 254 The court applied a multiple
pronged approach in reaching its decision. 255 The first step is to
determine the foreseeability of the harm. 256 The defendant’s
office was well aware of the patient’s abuse of prescription drugs,
as evidenced by the comments in the medical records. 257
Therefore, the accident was foreseeable. 258 The second factor is
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
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Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tenn. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id. at 331–33.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 331–33.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
Id.
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“the possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury[.]” 259 As
demonstrated by accidents involving intoxicated drivers, “the
possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury” that might
happen from not warning a patient of the potential side-effects
of medication on a patient’s ability to drive safely is
substantial. 260 The third element is “the importance or social
value of the activity engaged in by defendant[.]” 261 The
providing of medical care is of the utmost importance both to the
patient and to society. 262 The next factor is “the usefulness of
the conduct to defendant[.]” 263 There is no benefit to the patient
in failing to follow a warning about the medication. 264 The last
consideration is “the feasibility of alternative, safer conduct and
the relative costs and burdens associated with that conduct; the
relative usefulness of the safer conduct[.]” 265
The most
straightforward approach would be to warn the patient of the
medication’s side-effects on the patient’s capacity to safely
operate a car. 266 These factors’ totality demonstrates that the
defendant owed a duty to both the patient and injured third
parties concerning the danger to operate a vehicle safely while
taking the drugs. 267
The court then examined whether the defendant owed a
duty to the plaintiffs as members of the motoring public in
formulating the decision to issue the medication to the
patient. 268 This question can only be answered by considering
public policy factors. The judges looked at similar cases in
Indiana and Hawaii that declined to find that a doctor owed a
non-patient plaintiff a duty of care. 269 After all, the doctor’s
primary loyalty must be to the patient. 270 Forcing a physician
to predict a patient’s behavioral reaction to a drug and to

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. (quoting McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 332–33.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 334–35.
Id. at 334.
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consider possible plaintiffs would divide that fidelity. 271 The
physician’s duty must remain with the patient when medication
is prescribed. 272
Likewise, doctors and patients must
contemplate factors like “cost-effectiveness, and availability of
insurance coverage in prescribing decisions.” 273 Weighing the
social utility of pharmaceuticals and the many issues that must
be considered in prescribing choices, existing tort law should be
enough to discourage careless prescribing decisions. 274 Imposing
a duty to warn may decrease the risk to third parties, but there
is no rational, sound, or persuasive justification to add the risk
of tort liability to non-patient third parties injured in car
accidents. 275
7. Utah
B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West presented the issue of whether a
physician owed a duty to a non-patient to exercise reasonable
care in providing medication that poses “a risk of injury to third
parties.” 276 This tragic matter involved a nurse practitioner who
gave her patient a cocktail of medications which were in his
system at the time he shot and killed his wife. 277 The
“[d]efendant[] [maintained] that healthcare providers owe no
duty to a [third party] who has been injured by a patient unless
. . . the provider has custody or control of the patient, or where
the physician is on notice that the patient is uniquely dangerous
to [identified] third parties.” 278
The court noted that cases in the state demonstrate that a
healthcare provider is not obligated to control a patient’s
independent conduct. 279 Such cases also do not support the
defendant’s position that a healthcare provider may negligently
prescribe medication that results in a patient harming a third
party. 280 A doctor-patient relationship is not necessary to
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/4
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id.
B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 275 P.3d 228, 229 (Utah 2012).
Id. at 229–30.
Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 233.
Id.
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support a physician’s duty to a third person. 281 There are other
factors that impose a duty upon a physician to use care when
prescribing medication. 282 Generally, there is a duty to exercise
reasonable care when involved in conduct that creates a risk of
harm to others, including a health care provider prescribing
drugs to a patient. 283 After all, the doctor is better positioned to
use reasonable care in prescribing medication so that patients
do not pose an unreasonable risk of injury to others. 284 While
prescribing medication has substantial social value,
pharmaceuticals’ utility is not enough to justify the disavowal of
a duty to use proper care in prescribing them. 285
B. Cases That Have Not Allowed Recovery
Most cases that refuse to impose liability do so because
there is no privilege between the doctor and injured third party,
and the courts refuse to expand physician liability to third
parties on public policy grounds. 286
1. Connecticut
Connecticut ruled that a physician does not owe a duty to
an injured third party in Jarmie v. Troncale. 287 The defendant
is a gastroenterologist who treated a patient for hepatic
encephalopathy. 288 That individual lost consciousness and
crashed into the plaintiff’s vehicle causing significant injuries. 289
Suit was filed against the physician, claiming he failed to warn
the patient not to drive. 290 The claim was dismissed and upheld
on appeal. 291
The plaintiff asserted that the duty to inform was owed and
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
2005)).
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id. at 236–37.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 231–32 (citing Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah
Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802, 826 (Conn. 2012).
Id. at 804.
Id. at 805.
Id.
Id. at 805, 828.
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that applying the rule to injured third parties is consistent with
state law. 292 The defense countered that Connecticut does not
recognize a duty owed to unidentifiable members of society. 293
The court agreed with the defense and noted the state’s law does
not support such a claim because the plaintiff was an
“unidentifiable victim, [thus] public policy considerations
counsel against it, and there is no consensus among courts in
other jurisdictions, which have considered the issue only
rarely.” 294 “Absent a special relationship” dealing with custody
or control, no duty is present to safeguard a third party from the
actions of another; in fact, the Connecticut courts have used
restraint when given the chance to extend a health care
provider’s obligation to those not their patients. 295 Even if it was
foreseeable that the patient might have caused an accident, the
plaintiff was not part of an identifiable group of victims. 296
Finally, imposing liability on physicians under the
circumstances would establish a considerable risk of influencing
conduct in undesirable ways because it would obstruct the
doctor-patient relationship and cause increased lawsuits. 297
2. Florida
In Werner v. Varner, Stafford & Seaman, P.A., the plaintiff
was hurt in a rear-end car accident when his vehicle was struck
by an individual who suffered a seizure while driving. 298 The
plaintiff sought to find the doctor liable for his failure to warn
the patient to avoid driving while taking anti-epileptic
medication. 299 The court ruled there could be no viable cause of
action because the plaintiff was “neither known nor identifiable
to [the defendant]” and was merely a member “of the driving
public at large.” 300 Even if the court assumed the doctor had a
duty to warn his patient, there is no allegation that physician’s
292. Id. at 809.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 810.
295. Id. at 810–11.
296. Id. at 813.
297. Id. at 816.
298. Werner v. Varner, Stafford & Seaman, P.A., 659 So. 2d 1308, 1309
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1310.
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failure to warn the patient not to operate her car while
medicated proximately caused the incident. 301 The complaint
itself failed to contain any allegations that the accident
happened while the patient was medicated or that the physician
had the duty to warn his patient not to drive because of his
epileptic condition. 302
3. Georgia
In 2020, Georgia addressed the issue in Stanley v. Garrett
and found that no duty was created to a third person because
that individual was not a patient of the physician. 303 The facts
reveal the defendant was treating a patient for alcoholism; that
person then killed the plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident while
intoxicated. 304
Suit was filed against the physician for
negligence in treating the patient and failing to prevent him
from driving despite meeting with him a few hours before the
collision. 305 The court disagreed and noted there is no legal duty
“to control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from
causing physical harm to others.” 306 More specifically, a
physician has no duty to exercise control over another unless
there is a special relationship between the actor and another
creating a duty upon the actor to control that individual’s actions
to benefit a third person. 307
This determination requires a two-part test: (1) the doctor
must have control over the patient; and (2) the physician must
have known that the patient was expected to cause harm to
others. 308 Nevertheless, absent the legal ability to impose
restrictions on the patient’s liberty, no duty to control arises. 309
There is also nothing in Georgia law that would allow the doctor
to commit the patient for involuntary treatment because the
301. Id. at 1311.
302. Id.
303. Stanley v. Garrett, 848 S.E.2d 890, 895–96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020).
304. Id. at 892.
305. Id. at 892–93.
306. Id. at 894 n.13 (citing SecureAlert, Inc. v. Boggs, 815 S.E.2d 156, 161
(Ga. Ct. App. 2018)).
307. Id. at 894 (citation omitted).
308. Id. at 894–95 (citation omitted).
309. Id. at 895 (citing Houston v. Bedgood, 588 S.E.2d 437, 440 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003)).
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patient was under the influence of alcohol. 310 A malpractice
claim also mandates there must be a doctor-patient relationship
with the claimant; that relationship is not present with a third
party who is injured by the actions of the patient. 311
The decedent’s estate sued the psychiatrist who was
treating the driver for alcoholism and depression. 312 The facts
show that the patent had consumed alcohol both before and after
an emergency meeting with the defendant on the day of the
accident. 313 The plaintiff alleged that the physician was
negligent in his treatment and owed a duty to prevent the
patient from driving that day. 314
The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the
claim and noted that as a general rule, there is no duty to
“control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from
causing physical harm to others.” 315 The plaintiff pointed to no
precedent to support the assertion that a physician must start
involuntary treatment of a patient any time there is reason to
think a patient is under the influence of alcohol. 316 Implicitly,
the plaintiff asserts that the court should construe the state’s
involuntary treatment statute as analogous to a dram-shop act
but for physicians. 317 However, the court has previously refused
to find that the duty of a health care provider to the public is
similar to that imposed upon alcohol providers. 318 Georgia law
also requires physician-patient privity to bring a malpractice
claim, and it is undisputed that the decedent third party was not
the defendant’s patient. 319
4. Iowa
In Kolbe v. State, the Iowa Supreme Court found a physician
owed no duty to the public because of a patient’s negligent
310. Id. at 895–96.
311. Id. at 894.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 892–93.
315. Id. at 894 n.13 (citing SecureAlert, Inc. v. Boggs, 815 S.E.2d 156, 161
(Ga. Ct. App. 2018)).
316. Id. 895.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 895–96.
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driving. 320 The plaintiff was struck while riding his bicycle by a
man operating a car with significant vision impairment; the
defendants were two physicians who had notified the
Department of Transportation several years apart that the
motorist could drive with restrictions. 321 The trial judge granted
the physicians’ summary judgment motion, and this appealed
followed. 322
The main issue on review was:
whether a physician owes a duty to persons not
within the physician/patient relationship.
Specifically, [the court focused on] whether
physicians owe a duty to unknown third parties
when rendering an opinion to the Iowa
Department of Transportation regarding a
patient’s competency to drive. 323
The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts and noted
no duty exists to control the actions of a third party to stop him
from inflicting harm to another unless: “(a) a special relation
exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (b)
a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
gives to the other a right to protection.” 324
The plaintiffs claimed that the certifying physicians had a
duty to protect the public from any danger the motorist
presented to others. 325 The court retorted that not only is there
a lack of privity, but there is no special relationship between the
physicians and the plaintiffs “that is sufficiently close and direct
to support a legal claim against the physicians for [their]
injuries.” 326 Furthermore, the defendants were not responsible
for issuing the driver’s license. 327 That determination was
320. Kolbe v. State, 661 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003).
321. Id. at 144–45.
322. Id. at 145.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 146 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. L.
INST. 1965)).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 147.
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rendered by the Iowa Department of Transportation, and the
opinions of the doctors were only one factor in that decision. 328
From a public policy point of view, it is not the physician’s
responsibility to safeguard all third parties who might come into
contact with a physician’s patient. Forcing a duty upon health
care providers under the circumstances would intrude upon the
physician’s main responsibility—treating the patient. 329
Doctors must be permitted to satisfy their obligations to a
patient without apprehension of third-party liability claims for
a patient’s actions over which they have no control. 330
5. Kansas
In Calwell v. Hassen, the Kansas Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether a physician owed a duty to an injured bicyclist
arising from his failure to warn the patient not to drive. 331 The
plaintiff was injured in an accident when a woman who suffered
from drowsiness fell asleep while driving. 332 The defendant
treated her for the sleep disorder and never informed the patient
that she should refrain from operating an automobile. 333 The
Court of Appeals found that under § 315 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the doctor-patient relationship established a
“special relationship” and “there may have been a duty to warn
[the patient] not to drive.” 334
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed this determination. 335
Not one of its prior rulings involved a “special relationship”
between a doctor and patient. 336 In this case, the special
relationship is between the doctor and the patient, not the doctor
and injured plaintiff. 337 Furthermore, the patient already knew
of her sleeping problem and understood that she should pull over
328. Id.
329. Id. at 149 (citing Est. of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 676 A.2d 1223, 1225
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).
330. Id. 150.
331. Calwell v. Hassan, 925 P.2d 422, 424 (Kan. 1996).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 427 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. L. INST.
1965)).
335. Id. at 435.
336. Id. at 429.
337. Id. at 431.
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if she felt drowsy while driving. 338 There was also no showing
that the medication given to the patient caused or aggravated
her drowsiness problem. 339
Just providing care to another does not by itself create
liability. That care must be such that the physician should
recognize it as being needed to protect a third person. 340 The
court refused to impose a duty upon physicians to warn a patient
of something the person already knows. The defendant did
nothing to increase the risk of harm, so no duty was owed the
plaintiff. 341
6. Massachusetts
Massachusetts has a bifurcated position in that it imposes
a duty upon the physician to third parties injured from
medication use but not from liability related to the treatment of
a medical condition. 342 This dual position is explained in Medina
v. Hochberg, 343 which involved a patient who suffered a seizure
while driving and struck the plaintiff as he was exiting his car. 344
The injured plaintiff sued the treating doctor asserting that he
owed a duty to the patient to control his behavior because a
special relationship of doctor-patient existed. 345
In the
alternative, it was alleged that the physician violated the duty
owed to the plaintiff by failing to warn the patient not to drive. 346
The court ruled that the defendant did not owe a duty to the
plaintiff under ordinary negligence principles. 347 It also refused
to extend the narrow principle announced in Coombes v.
Florio, 348 that a doctor “owes a limited duty to third parties,
foreseeably at risk from a patient’s decision to operate a motor
vehicle, to warn the patient of the known side effects of
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 432 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. L.
INST. 1965)).
341. Id. at 434.
342. Medina v. Hochberg, 987 N.E.2d 1206, 1208 (Mass. 2013).
343. Id. at 1208.
344. Id. at 1207.
345. Id. at 1207–08.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1208.
348. Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 567 (Mass. 2007).
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medications the physician has prescribed that might impair the
patient’s ability as a motorist.” 349 In some matters, a physician
may have a duty to warn a patient of the dangers attendant to
their treatment. 350 This would include telling the person of
symptoms reasonably likely to occur from treatment that would
make it unsafe to engage in activities such as driving. 351 The
duty of care may also mandate that a health care provider notify
a patient of the side effects of medication if it is determined that
such information is necessary to the patient’s making an
informed decision. 352 However, the court will not extend the
duty owed by physicians to the members of the public who may
be harmed by a patient due to an underlying medical problem
that the doctor is treating. 353 Imposing such a duty would
mandate warning patients about the risks related to driving
based on any number of pre-existing health issues, none of which
relate to the doctor’s active treatment of the patient. 354 From a
public policy and cost-benefit analysis, “weighing the benefits of
such a duty against the countervailing costs of intruding into the
highly personal, confidential physician-patient relationship”
militates against imposing liability. 355
7. New Jersey
In Vizzoni v. B.M.D., the New Jersey court declined to find
that a prescribing physician “owes a duty to warn their patients
of adverse side effects of medications for the benefit of third
parties.” 356 This matter involved a fatal motor vehicle accident
caused by the defendant’s patient whose negligent driving was
the result of prescription medication. 357 The health care
provider argued that he owed no duty to the decedent because

349. Medina, 987 N.E.2d at 1208 (citing Coombes, 877 N.E.2d at 567).
350. Id. at 1210.
351. Id. (citing Vasa v. Compass Med., P.C., 921 N.E.2d 963, 965–66
(Mass. 2010)).
352. Id. (citing Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Mass.
2002)).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1211–12.
355. Id. at 1212–13.
356. Vizzoni v. B.M.D., 212 A.3d 962, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
357. Id. at 965.
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she was not a readily identifiable victim. 358 The trial judge
agreed and opined that “many substances could render a driver
sleepy and all of them are clearly marked with those kinds of
warning[s].” 359 This decision was upheld on appeal, where the
court focused on foreseeability and fairness. 360 The appellate
court noted that New Jersey courts have acknowledged the
obligation of a mental health professional to take reasonable
actions to safeguard a readily recognizable victim placed in
harm’s way by their patient. 361 However, the court believed the
proper “question is whether the defendant had a duty to act for
the benefit of another but failed to do so.” 362 The law requires a
practitioner who issues medication that impairs the patient’s
abilities thereby placing third parties at risk, to use reasonable
care in making that decision, but that is not the issue. 363 The
proper inquiry is whether the consequences of giving medication
was foreseeable to the prescriber. 364 The court answered this
question by ruling that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude
that the drug caused the patient to strike the opposing car. 365
This decision was supported by reference to Massachusetts and
Hawaii cases that found a prescribing physician cannot be found
responsible for an injury caused by a patient unless the drug
itself caused the harm. 366
In 2020, the New Jersey court reaffirmed this holding in
Bland v. K.R., when it ruled that its reporting statute for
seizures does not create an independent cause of action for
negligence against a physician. 367 The law merely establishes a
mechanism for physicians to report to the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, a driver who suffers from seizures. 368

358. Id. at 967.
359. Id. at 969.
360. Id. at 977.
361. Id. at 972.
362. Id. at 973.
363. Id. at 974.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 979.
366. Id. at 978 (citing Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 567 (Mass. 2007);
McKenzie v. Haw. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 47 P.3d 1209 (Haw. 2002)).
367. Bland v. K.R., No. A-1837-18T1, 2020 WL 2510361, at *7–8 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 2020).
368. Id. at *7.
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8. North Dakota
The North Dakota Supreme Court entertained the question
in 2019 and found that a physician has no duty to a third party
due to the doctor’s failure to warn a patient about the risks of
driving linked to a medical condition. 369 In Cichos v. Dakota Eye
Institute, P.C., a man drove his truck on a highway when he
struck a horse-driven trailer killing one of five passengers and
injuring others. 370 Suit was filed against the truck driver, who
then assigned his malpractice claim against the eye doctor to the
plaintiffs. 371 The issue was framed as “whether a physician in
North Dakota owes a duty to third parties to warn a patient
regarding vision impairments to driving.” 372 The facts show that
the driver was legally blind, and a doctor at the defendant’s
clinic issued a certificate of blindness and told the patient not to
drive. 373 Several weeks later, another doctor employed by the
defendant examined the man and said that his vision had
improved and told him that he could drive with restrictions. 374
The plaintiffs claimed that while his vision had gotten better, it
was still below the minimum vision required to operate a vehicle
and that the defendant owed a duty to the injured parties to
warn the patient about the status of his vision. 375 However,
whether to impose a physician’s duty to an injured third party
who is not a patient is a controversy that has smoldered as the
medical and legal communities struggle over whether policy and
fairness considerations mandate the expansion of the law to
impose liability upon a health care provider for injuries
sustained by a third party that are foreseeable.
The court denied the claim and noted that they were
unimpressed with the cases cited by the plaintiffs because they
involved the administering of medication to patients. 376 This
dispute merely involved an eye examination. 377 In the cases
around the country dealing with the issue, the courts are split
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
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Cichos v. Dakota Eye Inst., P.C., 933 N.W.2d 452, 459 (N.D. 2019).
Id. at 454.
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Id. at 454.
Id. at 454–55.
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Id. at 458–59.
Id. at 454–55.
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on whether a duty is owed. 378 The North Dakota court was
persuaded by the cases that found no third party duty existed on
public policy grounds. 379 Those decisions were then summarized
and adopted without much additional explanation other than
the court’s concluding that “a physician has no duty to third
parties arising from the physician’s failure to warn a patient
about driving risks resulting from the patient’s medical
condition.” 380
9. Oklahoma
In Tucker v. Lam, a woman was injured in the doctor’s
parking lot by a patient placed in her car by a member of the
physician’s staff allegedly knowing she was incapable of
driving. 381 The patient then struck the plaintiff with her
automobile in a lot. The lawsuit against the physician was
premised upon “her status as an invitee under principles of
common law premises liability.” 382 In denying the plaintiff’s
claim, the court noted that “[j]ust because the defendant has
created a risk which harmed the plaintiff . . . does not mean that,
in the absence of some duty to the plaintiff, the defendant will
be held liable.” 383
Oklahoma law acknowledges that an individual “may have
a duty to an injured party where a special relationship exists
between that person and the third person.” 384 This will occur
when the defendant has “‘special knowledge about the third
person and control over that third person,’” and the defendant
has power over some subject related to that third person; or
because of a special situation that “‘reasonably give[s] notice to
that person relative to a third person.’” 385 In this matter, the
defendant had no control over the patient. 386 Therefore, the
proper issue is “whether special circumstances existed that
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
2009)).
386.

Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Tucker v. Lam, 313 P.3d 1011, 1012 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013).
Id. at 1013.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1014 (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting J.S. v. Harris, 227 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Okla. Civ. App.
Id.
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reasonably gave [the defendant] notice that” the plaintiff would
be harmed from the patient’s driving her car. 387 The fact that
the patient was unsteady on her feet did not put the defendant
on notice that she would cause an accident. 388 Many people drive
a vehicle despite limitations that make it difficult to walk. 389
Therefore, no evidence existed that placed the defendant on
notice that circumstances were present that would impose a
special duty on the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the
harm caused by the patient. 390
10. Pennsylvania
Several Pennsylvania decisions have refused to impose
liability on physicians for failure to stop impaired patients from
driving. 391 For example, in Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, the
issue was whether an ophthalmologist might be held liable to a
third person where the physician failed to notify his patient or
the Department of Transportation of the patient’s limited vision,
and the individual then injured another while driving. 392 The
court refused to impose a duty upon the physician under the
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code or Regulations, noting that
neither “expressly or implicitly provide” for a private cause of
action for the failure to report a vision problem. 393 The Code only
requires physicians and others to supply the state with
information on those diagnosed as having a medical condition
determined to affect a person’s ability to drive. 394 That
notification then triggers a state investigation “and possible
further action to suspend the driver’s license.” 395
As to whether the reporting statute impliedly provides a
private remedy is subject to a three-part analysis: (1) “does the
statute create a . . . right in favor of plaintiff;” (2) “is there any
indication of [a] legislative intent” to create a private remedy;
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1015.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See 3 WEST’S PA. PRAC., TORTS: LAW AND ADVOCACY Liability of
Physicians to Non-Patients § 7.6, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020).
392. Est. of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 624 (Pa. 1999).
393. Id. at 626 (citing 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 1518(b) (West 2004)).
394. Id.
395. Id.
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and, (3) is it harmonious with the purposes of the law to “imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff?” 396 The statute’s intent is to
obtain information about licensed drivers rather than any
association between third parties and physicians. One may
maintain that a private remedy would inspire physicians to
notify the Driver’s Bureau of any disorders, but that policy
concern is better left to the legislature. 397 An independent cause
of action is inconsistent with the “purpose or spirit of the Motor
Vehicle Code.” 398 Also, “[i]t may be reasonably foreseeable that
a patient exposed to an infectious and communicable disease . .
. will injure a third party unless properly informed to prevent
the spread of the disease.” 399 However, it is an unreasonable
expansion of duty and foreseeability to expand a doctor’s duty to
a patient and “hold a physician liable to the public at large”
based upon the facts of this case. 400 This is particularly true
when a physician “did not cause or aggravate a medical
condition that affected the patient’s driving,” and the patient is
aware of that medical condition. 401 An injured third party is
simply not a foreseeable victim that the court will recognize, nor
extend foreseeability outside the point of recognition, for to do so
will make liability boundless. 402
The court “will not
403
countenance” this result.
11. Texas
A Texas court in 1983 determined that under the proper
circumstance, a physician may owe a duty to use reasonable care
to safeguard the driving public “where the physician’s
negligence in diagnosis or treatment of a patient contributes to
plaintiff’s injuries.” 404 However, that ruling was subsequently
modified in Helms v. Gonzalez, which involved a fatal car
accident when a methadone patient fell asleep at the wheel. 405
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
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Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Tex. App. 1983).
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47

196

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 41.2

The victims filed suit against the doctor who treated the addict
but the evidence revealed that the defendant fulfilled his duty to
warn of the drug’s side effects, including insomnia, drowsiness,
and faintness, and dizziness. 406 Therefore, the defendant
satisfied his duty to warn the patient about the side effects of
methadone, the physician had no obligation to stop the patient
from driving, and he was not negligent in connection with the
car accident. 407
Likewise, in Praesel v. Johnson, the Texas Supreme Court
found no duty existed to warn an epileptic patient not to operate
a car or to report the patient’s condition to the state’s licensing
authority. 408 Physicians are permitted but not required to notify
the Department of Public Safety or the Medical Advisory Board
of the identity of a patient “whom the physician has diagnosed
as having a disorder specified in a rule of the Department.” 409
However, the patient’s license is not automatically revoked. 410
“The Board can recommend that a driver be permitted to retain
a license even if there has been a seizure within three years.” 411
Therefore, the law offers no sensible reason for imposing a
negligence per se standard for “failing to report an epileptic
seizure to state licensing authorities.” 412
In deciding whether to compel a common-law obligation, the
court will consider the “social, economic, and political questions
and their application to the facts at hand.” 413 Balancing the
usefulness of issuing a warning to a patient not to drive who
already knows that he suffers from seizures “against the burden
of liability to third parties . . . is incremental but that the
consequences of imposing a duty [upon a physician] are great.” 414
The accountability for the proper use of a vehicle should stay
primarily with the driver, who can determine whether it is
appropriate to drive after a disorder has been diagnosed and

406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1998).
409. Id. at 394 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 12.096(a)
(West 2001)).
410. Id. at 395.
411. Id. (citing 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 15.58 (1976)).
412. Id. at 396.
413. Id. at 397 (citation omitted).
414. Id. at 398.
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seizures have happened. 415 Therefore, the court will not impose
on doctors a duty to third parties to warn an individual with
epilepsy not to operate a car. 416
V.

CONCLUSION

Duty of care is a critical component of any negligence claim
to create liability. It is well recognized at common law that a
physician owes a duty to advise a patient but is not mandated to
take affirmative measures outside the physician-patient
relationship to protect a third-party. Health care providers may
also be responsible for oversight, or the failure to safeguard a
patient, due to a special relationship of care they undertake,
such as failing to correctly diagnose or recommend a proper
treatment plan. Recently, the courts have struggled over
whether public policy and fairness require the expansion of the
law to impose liability upon a health care provider for injuries
sustained by a third party that are foreseeable.
The first deviation from the common law occurred when the
court imposed a duty upon a mental health professional to a
third person when the analyst learns that a patient will harm a
specific person. 417 This was followed by an expansion of liability
when a third party is exposed to a communicable disease due to
the doctor’s failure to report the positive results or negligently
explain the test’s outcome. The courts have occasionally found
that doctors owe a duty to inform third parties of a genetic trait
possessed by a relative or hold independent medical examiners
liable for those they examine on behalf of an insurance company,
employer or attorney.
The most recent attempt to expand physician liability
involves injuries sustained by innocent third parties in motor
vehicle accidents due to a patient’s medical condition or adverse
medication reaction. Various theories are advanced to establish
liability, such as the physician was negligent by violating a
statute created to protect the public through negligence per se,
establishing prima facie negligence, or offering evidence of
carelessness. No clear consensus has emerged as to whether the
common law should be expanded in favor of responsibility. Most
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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cases that refuse to impose liability do so because there is no
privity between the doctor and injured third party, or they refuse
to create a duty to third parties on public policy grounds. Courts
that have allowed recovery look at foreseeability as a critical
consideration in establishing a duty of care or feel that public
policy is the overriding factor that makes a physician liable for
the patient’s actions.
These assaults on the common law will not abate. Litigation
is a way of life and enterprising attorneys will continue to
advance theories in an attempt to find physicians liable to third
parties as the result of the misconduct of their patients. As the
split in the court rulings show, the proper determination is in
the eyes of the beholder and there are valid points in both
positions.
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